Bail In Orlando
Bail In Orlando Fl – High Court: Tel Aviv Stores to Remain Open on Shabbat
Source : Haaretz News
By : llan Lior
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
The High Court of Justice approved on Wednesday Tel Aviv bylaws that would allow around 160 grocery and convenience stores to open on the Jewish Sabbath in three areas of the city. The stores will be allowed to open on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday to sunset on Saturday, in the Jaffa Port, Tel Aviv Port and the Old Railway Station (Hatachana).
The three-justice panel rejected the government’s request for another extension until Interior Minister Arye Dery decides whether to approve the bylaw. Supreme Court President Justice Miriam Naor and justices Esther Hayut and Daphne Barak-Erez unanimously ruled that the Tel Aviv bylaws are “proportional” and should be published in the official government gazette, after which they will become law. In their ruling, the justices criticized the government’s delaying tactics in which it avoided making a decision on the issue for the two and a half years since the Tel Aviv city council passed the bylaws.
The High Court of Justice also ruled that the government failed to meet a number of its commitments to reach a final decision on the bylaws. As a result, the court said this indecision must be viewed as a decision in practice to reject the bylaws without any explanation, which is invalid, wrote Naor.
The limited number of areas where stores may open was also balanced, which “take into consideration the various rights, the character of the city and the interests of the status of the Sabbath day,” she said. These compounds have clearly delineated borders and are separate from residential areas.
The four different interior ministers, Sa’ar, Gilad Erdan, Silvan Shalom and Dery, who served in the two and a half years since the bylaws were passed have all avoided making a final decision on approving the new regulations. So far, the government has explained this delay by the possibility of merging the city of Tel Aviv with its southern neighbor Bat Yam, and asking the court to wait until such a merger was concluded. Dery, the chairman of the ultra-Orthodox Shas party, said the decision was a breach of the religious status quo. He said that just before Passover last week he decided to overrule the bylaws and had intended on announcing it in the next few days. The decision will seriously harm the “holy Sabbath and the character of the Jewish People.” “I plan on meeting with [Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] soon along with members of the United Torah Judaism [party], and other ministers and members of Knesset for whom the Sabbath is important, and protest the serious harm to the status quo on the matter of the Sabbath,” said Dery. “We will act to restore the status quo with all available means.”
Tel Aviv Mayor Ron Huldai said “the city of Tel Aviv was always free and will remain free.” Different and diverse communities live in the city and live together with mutual tolerance, he added. The new legal arrangements are meant to express this balance between observing the Sabbath as a day of rest and the needs of residents and the ability to allow everyone to enjoy their day of rest as they so desire, Huldai said. Health Minister Yaakov Litzman, the chairman of United Torah Judaism, spoke out against the High Court ruling, calling it a severe attack on the Jewish character of Israel. “This is the continuation of the gross judicial intervention in the values of religion and Jewish law, which leaves no choice but to advance a legal move to bypass the High Court of Justice in order to prevent the continued erosion of the Jewish tradition and religion in Israel.” Meretz Chairwoman Zehava Galon praised the decision, saying it is important approval of the right of the residents of Tel Aviv to decide for themselves in a democratic manner, as well as for the authority of the city to pass bylaws accordingly. “Today, sanity overcame the voices aspiring to establish a halakha state in Israel,” said Galon, referring to Jewish religious law. MK Elazar Stern (Yesh Atid) said the government has once again forced the High Court to decide on matters of the character of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. When the legislator is negligent in carrying out his duty he leaves no choice except for the High Court to decide on fundamental issues of our lives in Israel. “It is a good thing there are judges in Jerusalem,” said Stern.
Read more here: haaretz.com/.premium-1.784440
Bail In Orlando – How ‘ideologically uniform’ is the legal academy?
Source : Washington Post News
By : Jonathan H. Adler
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
How much more liberal are law professors than members of the legal profession? A new paper by Adam Bonica (Stanford University), Adam S. Chilton (University of Chicago), Kyle Rozema (Northwestern University) and Maya Sen (Harvard University), “The Legal Academy’s Ideological Uniformity,” provides some answers. Their bottom line: The legal academy is significantly more liberal than the legal profession, which is notable because the legal profession itself is more liberal than the public at large. Here is how the authors summarize some of their findings: We find that approximately 15% of law professors are conservative and that only approximately one out of every twenty law schools have more conservative law professors than liberal ones. In addition, we find that these patterns vary, with higher-ranked schools having an even smaller presence of conservative law professors. We then compare the ideological balance of the legal academy to that of the legal profession. Compared to the 15% of law professors that are conservative, 35% of lawyers overall are conservative. Law professors are more liberal than graduates of top 14 law schools, lawyers working at the largest law firms, former federal law clerks, and federal judges. Although we find that professors are more liberal than the alumni at all but a handful of law schools, there is a strong relationship between the ideologies of professors from a law school and the ideologies of alumni from that school. However, this relationship is weaker for schools with more conservative alumni.
These findings are based upon an examination of reported political donations. While this is an admittedly imperfect measure of ideology, it does allow for comparisons across population groups. Moreover, reliance on political donations is less selective than one might think, as the authors report that more than 60 percent of law professors made reported political donations between 1979 and 2014. Although the authors believe that other factors explain some of the split between the ideology of legal academics and legal practitioners, even after accounting for such factors, they find that law professors are significantly more liberal than lawyers generally. Does this matter? I’ve certainly argued that the ideological uniformity of legal academia affects teaching and scholarship (most recently here). The authors of this study suggest that it could also affect the political relevance and influence of law professors. They write: The ideological tilt of the legal academy has potentially broad implications. For instance, because law professors are overwhelmingly liberal, groups of law professors advocating for liberal positions can easily be marginalized. This letter was criticized by some as simply representing the views of the left leaning legal academy . . . . To assess … these criticisms, we match the signatories of the letter to our sample of law professor ideology, and find that only 4% of the signatories that appear in our data are conservative. This raises the question of whether the reception to the letter would have been different had more conservative law professors signed the letter. Although we have no way to answer this question, the endeavor might have been given more credence had more conservative professors participated in the letter: observers might have been less likely to expect Republican-leaning law professors to oppose Sessions ideologically, thus making such criticisms more powerful and effective. We argue that this example illustrates that the legal academy’s ideological uniformity limits its political credibility.
One could extend this analysis to current controversies at state universities, such as proposed measures to curtail tenure or limit the activities of legal clinics and academic centers at state universities. Appeals to “academic freedom” are less convincing when the only ones in a position to benefit from such principles sit on one side of the aisle. Writing in opposition to a proposed measure in North Carolina that would prohibit the University of North Carolina School of Law’s Center for Civil Rights from engaging in litigation, Gene Nichol suggested the center’s critics are “nakedly ideological” because they would have no problem with law school programs enlisting students in efforts to protect gun rights or religious liberty. He might be right, but how would we know? It’s not as if UNC’s law school has any such programs, or even a critical mass of right-leaning faculty members. I agree with much that Nichol has to say in his piece, but I also suspect his arguments would be more persuasive to a Republican-dominated state legislature if there were more ideological diversity on UNC’s law faculty and within the law school’s academic programming. Assuming there is substantial ideological uniformity in the legal academy, and that this is a problem, there remains the problem of what to do about it. Here the authors of the above-mentioned study note that remedial measures, such as some sort of “affirmative action” for right-leaning faculty, could compromise efforts to advance other values. I agree. However well-intentioned, heavy-handed efforts to impose “balance” on law school faculties could do more harm than good. I believe law schools should seek to encourage more viewpoint diversity within their ranks, but I oppose any such efforts that involve quotas or rigid requirements. This Iowa proposal to require partisan balance in university hiring, for example, strikes me as a supremely bad idea. In my opinion, the way forward begins with efforts to cultivate an appreciation of the value of differing perspectives and viewpoints and a broader recognition that ideological uniformity undermines effective legal education. The first step toward a solution is recognizing there’s a problem.
Read more here: washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/17/how-ideologically-uniform-is-the-legal-academy/
Bail In Orlando Fl – Save the Supreme Court’s Seniority System
Source : Haaretz News
By : Haaretz Editorial
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked’s campaign to destroy the Supreme Court moved up a level on Tuesday. Yedioth Ahronoth reported that Shaked is seeking to cancel the seniority method through which until now the Supreme Court president has been chosen. According to the constitutional custom observed since the state was founded, the new Supreme Court president is the justice with the most seniority on the day the previous court president retires. As with her other destructive proposals, Shaked’s suggestion isn’t original; the political system in recent years has often chosen to intervene in the changing of the guard at the helm of the High Court, generally during the sensitive period before the retirement of the incumbent. Other justice ministers who didn’t have in mind what’s best for the judicial system or the rule of law altogether have tried to tinker with the system.
Haim Ramon did so regarding the appointment of Dorit Beinisch to replace Aharon Barak. Later, the Knesset chose to pass the “Grunis law,” which allowed Asher Grunis to be appointed court president even though he was to serve less than three years until reaching the mandatory retirement age of 70 (undoing a restriction had been written into a law promoted by the previous justice minister, Daniel Friedmann). The timing of Shaked’s announcement is no coincidence either. This October current Supreme Court President Miriam Naor is retiring, and she is meant to be succeeded by Justice Esther Hayut. Though she preaches about separation of powers, Shaked is actually working to intensify the hold of the political system on the judicial branch, rather than freeing it to be an independent authority alongside the other branches of government.
The seniority system has two main inherent benefits. The first is that once a judge is appointed to the Supreme Court, he or she no longer has a need to compete for any future judicial post; he or she has no need to try to solicit the support of members of the Judicial Appointments Committee and there is no incentive to rule in a manner that will please politicians. The second benefit is that it eliminates competition among the justices, which facilitates their working harmoniously, with both agreements and disputes based solely on the merits of legal arguments and not on personal issues.
Those level-headed forces that still remain in the government with regard to the rule of law – most especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Finance Minister Moshe Kahlon – must now stand firm against the justice minister’s threats. They have a responsibility to act in a statesmanlike manner and block Shaked from implementing her harmful ideas. At the same time, all the Supreme Court justices must announce that they will not compete against Hayut for the court’s top spot. In Israel’s constitutional tradition there is no constitutional custom more deeply rooted than this one. Anyone who champions a conservative judicial approach must respect it.
Read more here: haaretz.com/opinion/editorial/1.779675
Bail In Orlando – Should Supreme Court justices have unlimited tenure?
Source : Wacotrib News
By : LORI A. RINGHAND PAUL M. COLLINS JR.
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch took the hot seat and offered testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. If confirmed, he will be one of only 113 people to sit on the high court since it was established in 1789. Why have so few people had this honor? Because the Constitution effectively grants life tenure to justices. The Constitution states that justices “shall hold their office during good behavior” and that they can be removed only by impeachment. In the 228-year history of the Supreme Court, only one justice has been impeached (and he was not removed); the others have served until their voluntary retirement or death. The United States is rare among the world’s constitutional democracies in granting unlimited tenure to unelected high court judges. The system does have some advantages. It protects justices from the influence of ordinary politics and allows them to focus on constitutional duties without considering any decision’s effects on future career opportunities. Nonetheless, legal scholars and political scientists increasingly question whether life tenure remains a good idea. While scholars disagree about the exact numbers, our Supreme Court justices are serving longer and longer terms; presidents have incentives to choose younger and younger nominees; and the justices themselves appear to delay retirement in the hope of having an ideologically compatible president select their replacements. Moreover, the confirmation process has become increasingly contentious, culminating last year in Senate Republicans refusing to even grant a hearing to President Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland. As a result, many scholars propose a shift to staggered 18-year terms. What are the pros and cons of such a change? Here’s a breakdown.
What would be good about 18-year terms?
First, term limits could make appointments less politically fraught. Our research shows that selecting Supreme Court nominees has always been political. That’s not a bad thing. Having elected officials select Supreme Court justices ensures that, over time, the Supreme Court’s decisions do not get too far out of step with public opinion. Such indirect public accountability probably is essential in a system like ours, where our justices are charged with deciding how words written hundreds of years ago apply to contemporary situations. But when the nation’s politics are polarized, partisan antagonism can shut down the entire system, as happened with Garland’s nomination and may happen now. Staggered 18-year terms could help prevent that, lowering the stakes for each nomination while retaining an appropriate level of democratic accountability. When fully implemented, 18-year terms would evenly distribute appointments so that each president would nominate two justices per term, with a midyear election falling in between. Vacancies would be predictable and evenly paced, draining confirmation hearings of much of the current drama. If a sitting justice dies or needs to step down before his or her expected resignation date, the seat could be temporarily filled by a lower court judge or a retired one, drawn from a pool and thus sitting by designation. Second, by tying appointments more predictably to each election’s results, this system would increase the Supreme Court’s democratic accountability. Studies have found that justices over time “drift” from the ideological preferences of the governing coalition that appointed them. More frequent turnover would reduce this drift. The Supreme Court’s views would better reflect the choices of the American people rather than vagaries of chance and time.
One major problem with life tenure is that justices serve for so long that they can become out of touch with the nation they help lead. Staggered 18-year terms minimize this risk. Finally, term limits could increase the quality of nominees. Like it or not, one of the driving factors behind current presidential appointments is a nominee’s age. Individuals older than about 60 years of age are unlikely to be appointed. (Garland, age 63 at the time of his nomination, was likely picked in part in hopes that his relatively advanced age would reduce opposition to his appointment.) This means presidents are intentionally excluding a sizable number of highly qualified individuals from serving on the Supreme Court. Term limits solve this problem.
And what would be bad about 18-year terms?
First, term limits may hurt judicial independence. One of the chief arguments against term limits is that life tenure frees the justices from political or popular pressure. Justices are not elected officials, and we don’t want them to respond too much to the passing passions of ordinary politics. We also don’t want them to worry too much about post-Supreme Court careers. Shorter terms could prompt justices to think too much about how their votes play in the arena of public opinion or — worse — how they may limit or help future earnings. Second, the Supreme Court’s legitimacy might be threatened by shorter terms. Life tenure enables the justices to interpret and apply the Constitution exactly the way they see fit, without considering pressure or repercussions. This perception of independence may be important to what scholars call the Supreme Court’s “diffuse support” — the perception that people support the Supreme Court regardless of disagreement with particular decisions because they believe the Supreme Court overall is engaged in something other than ordinary politics.
Third, staggered 18-year terms could not eliminate all risk of political gamesmanship. A determined Senate majority could still refuse to act on a nomination or vote down a nominee they found unacceptable. But term limits would change the political calculations and incentives by creating a predictable, fair distribution of seats over time and making each individual vacancy less consequential. The final argument against term limits may be the most important: They may be impossible to implement. Creating legally enforceable Supreme Court term limits would almost certainly require amending the Constitution. That’s unlikely to happen anytime soon. Any solution short of a constitutional amendment would require getting justices and senators to agree to change the norms and customs governing retirement and confirmation. In other words, they would have to voluntarily agree to play by a new set of rules. Given the state of politics today, that may be too much to ask. Lori A. Ringhand is the associate dean for academic affairs and J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law at the University of Georgia School of Law. Paul M. Collins Jr. is a professor of political science and director of legal studies at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. They are the authors of “Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings and Constitutional Change.”
Read more here: wacotrib.com/opinion/columns/guest_columns/lori-ringhand-paul-collins-jr-washington-post-should-supreme-court/article_8bcfada4-5a57-53ba-a30c-29657d912f56.html
Bail In Orlando Fl – Supreme Court hears arguments on the interplay between federal and state subrogation law
Source : Jurist News
By : Steven Wildberger
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
The US Supreme Court on Wednesday heard arguments in Coventry Health Care of Missouri, Inc. v. Nevils , a case that required the court to decide whether an insurer, guaranteed a right of subrogation through a Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) policy, actually has such a right when it is in contravention of the law of the state in which it seeks recovery. Jodie Nevils, a federal employee covered by an FEHBA policy that included a right of subrogation, or repayment, filed a lawsuit against Coventry, her insurer, after it enforced its subrogation lien against part of the settlement of a related personal injury claim. The law of Missouri, which governed the dispute, proscribes insurer subrogation rights as being against public policy. The FEHBA, however, expressly preempts state law with the following language:
The terms of any contract under this chapter which relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits (including with respect to benefits) shall supersede and preempt any State or local law, or any regulation issued thereunder, which relates to health insurance or plans.
The case came up for Supreme Court review in mid-2015, at which time it was remanded to the Missouri state court for re-argument due to a then-new Office of Personnel Management (OPM) statutory interpretation stating that the subrogation provisions should apply notwithstanding contrary state law. The Missouri court ruled again in Nevils’ favor, despite the OPM interpretation. The case now returns to the Supreme Court for full review.
Read More : jurist.org/paperchase/2017/03/supreme-court-hears-arguments-on-the-interplay-between-federal-and-state-subrogation-law.php
Bail In Orlando – Supreme Court to sit in Edinburgh this June in historic legal first
Source : Scottish Legal News
By : Press Release
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
The UK Supreme Court will sit in Edinburgh later this year, the first time that the UK’s highest court has sat outside London. Several appeals will be heard over up to four days in June, with at least five of the Supreme Court justices sitting over the course of the visit. The list of cases to be heard during the visit is in the process of being finalised.
The court will sit in the City Chambers, home of City of Edinburgh Council, and built originally as the Royal Exchange. Provision will be made for extensive public seating for those interested in observing proceedings at first hand. As the Supreme Court will not be sitting in a Scottish court building and will be following its standard rules and procedures, it is envisaged that proceedings will be filmed and relayed live online in the usual way.
Court staff will also use the opportunity to offer public talks about its work when the Justices are not sitting. Lord Neuberger, President of the Supreme Court, said: “We make every effort to ensure our proceedings are accessible throughout the UK via our free live streaming service. However, nothing beats being able to observe courts at first hand. We look forward to welcoming members of the public as well as lawyers during what is intended to be the first of a number of visits to the capital cities of the devolved nations.”
The Lord President, Lord Carloway, who will sit alongside Supreme Court justices to hear at least one appeal during the court’s visit to Edinburgh, said: “The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal in the UK for civil cases. I am delighted that it will sit in Edinburgh later this year, in the first of a number of planned visits to cities outside London. “I welcome the opportunity it provides for the public and the legal community in Scotland to see the court in action.”
Further details of public and media access arrangements, and the court listings, will be published in due course. Gordon Jackson QC, Dean of the Faculty of Advocates, said: “This is most welcome news, and the Faculty will be delighted to assist in any way. Hopefully, this visit will help give the people of Scotland a better understanding of the important role this court has.”
Read More : scottishlegal.com/2017/03/01/supreme-court-to-sit-in-edinburgh-this-june-in-historic-legal-first/#
Bail In Orlando Fl – A Guide to the Increasingly Political U.S. Supreme Court
Source : National Law Journal News
By : Tony Mauro
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
Just over a year ago, Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. voiced concern that the U.S. Supreme Court was being tainted by the politics of the confirmation process. “If the Democrats and Republicans have been fighting so fiercely about whether you’re going to be confirmed, it’s natural for some members of the public to think, well, you must be identified in a particular way as a result of that process,” Roberts said at the New England School of Law. He made those remarks before the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the unsuccessful nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to replace him, the endless and rancorous presidential campaign, and then the nomination by President Donald Trump of Judge Neil Gorsuch—whose upcoming confirmation hearing will almost certainly fit Roberts’ description to a T. Just this week, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg echoed Roberts’ concerns when she said at Stanford Law School that if she were up for confirmation now instead of 1993—when she was confirmed by a 96-3 vote—supporters like Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, “wouldn’t touch me with a 10-foot pole.”
The Supreme Court and politics is the subject of Lincoln Caplan’s recent book “American Justice 2016: The Political Supreme Court.” A lecturer and senior research scholar at Yale Law School, Caplan discussed the court’s political nature in a recent interview (before the nomination of Gorsuch) with Supreme Court Brief. In your book, you say flat out that the Supreme Court is a political institution, and not just in the sense of how justices are picked and confirmed. How else is it political? Caplan: Throughout its history, at various times, the Supreme Court has been a central concern of politics. Politics and court decisions have sometimes been tautly intertwined and even inseparable. A classic example is the decisions about New Deal legislation during the Great Depression—first, those striking down statutes, and, then, after the court reversed itself, those upholding them. Law that the court made in those moments was an extension of politics. But recently the court has become political in the sense that justices appointed by Republicans generally favor conservative outcomes in the most divisive and heavily publicized cases, and those appointed by Democrats generally favor more liberal outcomes. That has happened regularly since Elena Kagan replaced John Paul Stevens as a justice in 2010: this deep and recurring divide is a first in American history.
It’s not that justices vote as R’s and D’s, feeling beholden to support positions taken by the party of the president who picked them and the party they favor. Justices, by and large, reflect the liberal or conservative inclinations that presidents expect them to have when picking them, because their track record in the law and their professional experience reflect their “priors”—the attitudes, beliefs, dispositions, impulses, and so on that they bring to a case even before the apply law to facts. These political decisions contradict the image of law as distinct from politics. That is the romantic vision embodied in the beautiful Supreme Court building, which was designed to look like a Temple of Justice and is filled with art that depicts the law as noble and rising above politics. But it is the reality: The court is both a political institution and a legal one. How do you think the Supreme Court fared in the presidential election year in terms of both the perception and reality of its politicization, considering the sharp criticism by Republican candidates, Ginsburg’s serial putdowns of Donald Trump, and the Republican response to the Merrick Garland nomination? Caplan: Each of the developments you mention reinforced the view that the court is enveloped by politics—the reality as well as the perception.
The treatment of the Garland nomination was the worst. As the pollster Evans Witt told me, Chief Judge Garland—who is widely considered a superb judge and as independent as it’s possible to be on the bench—was reduced to a political pawn. It was clearly contrary to the Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional, for the Republican leadership of the Senate to refuse to consider his nomination. But there is no mechanism in the Constitution that allowed the American people to challenge the senators’ refusal to do their duty. In July, when Justice Ginsburg called Mr. Trump a “faker” and bemoaned the effect he would have on the court if he was elected president, her frank disapproval raised the serious question whether that political view also reflected how she votes in cases where liberals and conservatives—appointed by Democrats versus Republicans—tend to be on opposite sides. What she said wasn’t technically a violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct: currently, the code does not bind the justices. But that was a big part of the problem. The code articulates basic rules of judicial ethics and says explicitly that a federal judge should not take a public position about a candidate for election. The justice violated that principle. Hers was the latest in a string of related breaches of ethics by other justices going back a dozen years. The breach made clear that the court and the country would benefit if the court decided that the justices should be bound by the code, just like all other federal judges. The sharp criticism of the court by some Republican candidates underscored what a central place the court now has in American politics. The criticism was largely directed at court rulings about the divisive issues of abortion, affirmative action, and the like, where the court affirmed restrictive holdings but did not strike down practices that conservatives would like banned under the Constitution.
Read More : nationallawjournal.com/more-supreme-court-brief/id=1202778746854/A-Guide-to-the-Increasingly-Political-US-Supreme-Court?mcode=1202617204356&curindex=1&slreturn=20170110010226
Bail In Orlando – Data commissioner tells court US law fails to protect privacy
Source : Irish Times News
By : Mary Carolan
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
The Data Protection Commissioner has reached a provisional view that recent changes in US law fail to adequately protect the data privacy rights of European Union citizens whose personal data is sent to the United States, the Commercial Court has heard. Commissioner Helen Dixon made her draft finding in May 2016 after receiving independent expert advice on US law, her counsel Michael Collins said. The commissioner also got “unsolicited” submissions from the US government concerning the new Privacy Shield framework between the European Commission and US, he added. Before reaching a final view, the commissioner wants the Irish court to ask the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to decide the validity of European Commission decisions approving transatlantic data transfer channels – standard contractual clauses (SCCs) – used by Facebook and others. The commissioner’s provisional view is the SCCs do not guarantee protection of EU citizens’ data for reasons including the lack of access to effective remedies in the US for breach of data privacy rights. Her case has potentially enormous consequences for trade between the EU and US and data privacy rights of millions of EU citizens.
Complaint
It arises from a June 2013 complaint by Austrian lawyer Max Schrems alleging his privacy rights under the EU charter were breached by transfer of his personal data by Facebook Ireland to its US parent Facebook Inc. The complaint followed revelations by former US National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden of NSA surveillance of certain internet and telecommunications systems operated by companies including Facebook, Microsoft and Google. After the CJEU determined the existing Safe Harbour regime for EU-US data transfers was invalid because it failed to adequately protect data-privacy rights of EU citizens, the Irish courts directed the commissioner to investigate Mr Schrems’s complaint. The commissioner made a draft finding in May 2016 that the complaint was “well-founded” but wants a CJEU decision whether the SCCs are valid before finalising her decision. While her case is against Facebook and Mr Schrems as data sender and complainant, no orders are sought against them and the purpose of the action is to get a referral to the CJEU. The US government is among several parties involved as amici curiae, assistants to the court on legal issues.
Charter
Ms Justice Caroline Costello will hear evidence from legal experts on whether protections under US law for EU citizens’ data privacy rights are equivalent to the protections guaranteed under the EU charter and EU law. On Wednesday, Mr Collins said the commissioner’s view is developments in US law since 2013 do not adequately meet her concerns about deficiencies in US protections for data-privacy rights of EU citizens. Her view is that while EU citizens are not completely without redress in the US, “specific and general deficiencies” remain and the remedies available are fragmented, incomplete and arise only under certain factual circumstances.
She is also concerned about the difficulties facing EU citizens in getting access to the US courts to seek redress and about restrictive interpretations by the US courts of relevant legislative provisions. Even if a EU citizen meets the criteria for a remedy for electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Security Act, it appears, on foot of US court decisions, they cannot sue the US government, Mr Collins added. Developments since 2013 include a 2014 presidential policy directive 28 (PPD28) by former president Obama setting out “high-level principles” to be observed by intelligence agencies, especially in relation to non-US persons. While such executive or presidential orders have the force of law in the US, they don’t give rise to enforceable rights for parties, Mr Collins said. The Judicial Redress Act 2013 provided some extension of remedies of the 1974 Privacy Act to some non-US persons in designated countries but the US only last week designated the EU – excluding the UK and Denmark – as covered countries under the Act, he added.
Read More : irishtimes.com/business/technology/data-commissioner-tells-court-us-law-fails-to-protect-privacy-1.2968383
Bail In Orlando Fl – U.S. Supreme Court delays ruling on legal sports betting
Source : Washington Post News
By : Press Release
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
Supporters of legalized sports gambling in New Jersey and several other states were dealt a no-decision of sorts Tuesday when the U.S. Supreme Court delayed a ruling on whether it will take up the states’ challenge to a federal ban. The court invited the solicitor general to file a brief on behalf of the government, meaning a decision could take several more months. The high court had been expected to include the sports betting case in its announcement Tuesday on which cases it will hear this year. New Jersey is challenging a 1992 federal law that restricts sports betting to Nevada and three other states that already had approved some form of wagering. In recent briefs to the Supreme Court, lawyers representing the state have argued that the federal law violates the Constitution by preventing states from repealing their own laws.
Several states, including Mississippi, West Virginia, Arizona, Louisiana and Wisconsin, have joined New Jersey’s effort. In 2012 New Jersey enacted a law allowing betting at racetracks and casinos. The four major professional sports leagues and the NCAA sued to block the law from taking effect, arguing that the integrity of their games would be threatened and that there would be more game-fixing. A trial judge and federal appeals court ruled against the state. New Jersey then enacted a law in 2014 that repealed prohibitions against sports gambling at casinos and racetracks. But that law was defeated by a federal judge in New Jersey and a federal appeals court in Philadelphia.
Fewer late, canceled flights in November
The federal Department of Transportation reported Tuesday that 86.5 percent of U.S. flights in November arrived on time, an improvement over the previous month and November 2015. Fewer than one-third of 1 percent of domestic flights were canceled, the lowest rate since the department started keeping comparable records in 1995.
Hawaiian Airlines and Delta Air Lines posted the best rates for on-time arrivals, over 90 percent. Virgin America had the worst mark, 81.4 percent. Delta reported no canceled flights for the entire month but diverted 79 flights to alternative airports. Alaska, Frontier, Hawaiian and Virgin America canceled fewer than 20 flights each. ExpressJet and SkyWest, which operate flights for brands such as American Eagle and United Express, each canceled more than 300 flights. The airlines reported about two mishandled bags for every 1,000 passengers, the lowest rate in figures dating to 1987, the department said. Virgin America and Alaska had the best rates for bag handling, while ExpressJet and Frontier had the worst.
Read More : washingtonpost.com/business/economy/us-supreme-court-delays-ruling-on-legal-sports-betting/2017/01/17/dee504a6-dce4-11e6-ad42-f3375f271c9c_story.html?utm_term=.618f71b02e51
Bail In Orlando – Former Minnesota Supreme Court chief justice headed to U.S. Bank Stadium oversight panel
Source : Star Tribune News
By : Rochelle Olson
Category : Bail In Orlando , Bail In Orlando Fl
Former Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Kathleen Blatz is Gov. Mark Dayton’s choice to join the public oversight panel of U.S. Bank Stadium. Over a long career in politics and law, Blatz has been a popular and unassailable figure. She won her first election in 1978 to the state House as a moderate Republican from Bloomington, went on to become a Hennepin County judge and in 1996 received an appointment to the state Supreme Court from then-Gov. Arne Carlson. Just over a year later, he elevated her to chief justice. Blatz left the court in 2006. In recent years, she has worked as an arbitrator and served on several charitable boards.
Blatz, 62, said Friday that when Dayton called to ask her to join the Minnesota Sports Facilities Authority, she was intrigued. “I certainly value the importance of sports in our community,” she said. Blatz made a point of claiming her personal sports pedigree: As an undergraduate at the University of Notre Dame, she saw quarterback Joe Montana lead the Fighting Irish to a national championship. Still, she said she is not as much of a sports fan as was her late husband, businessman Wheelock Whitney. Until he died in May, Whitney and Blatz regularly attended Minnesota Vikings and Twins games. Whitney helped bring the Twins and the Minnesota North Stars to town and at one point was part owner of the Vikings.
Blatz, who will be at the next board meeting in February, comes aboard at a precarious time for the MSFA. Within the next two weeks, legislative auditor James Nobles is expected to release the findings of his investigation into how the MSFA controlled two luxury suites at the downtown Minneapolis stadium. And Republican legislators are preparing to delve into both the use of the suites and the operational structure of the MSFA. The two suites, which accommodate 18 spectators each, became a public issue after the Star Tribune reported that MSFA officials wouldn’t release the names of most of their guests. The MSFA recently acknowledged spending $32,000 in state money on food for guests. In the past month, many suite guests have identified themselves and reimbursed the state. Last month, the authority voted to stop inviting friends and family to the suites. They now are to be used exclusively for marketing contacts.
Legislators have expressed interest in taking one of the suites away from the MSFA. Some Republican leaders also questioned the need for two taxpayer-funded executive-level posts at the MSFA, held by Chairwoman Michele Kelm-Helgen and executive director Ted Mondale. Blatz comes to the board after Dayton declined to reappoint John Griffith, a former Target executive. He was the second commissioner to leave after questioning Kelm-Helgen’s leadership. Former GOP Sen. Duane Benson left in 2015 after raising issues about the board structure. Kelm-Helgen is a Dayton appointee, as is former DFL legislator Tony Sertich. Commissioners Bill McCarthy, state AFL-CIO president, and Capella University executive Barbara Butts Williams, were appointed by the city of Minneapolis. Blatz, Sertich, McCarthy and Williams are not paid a salary. Until recently, however, commissioners were usually given four tickets for every event in the stadium, including concerts and Vikings games.
Read More : startribune.com/former-minnesota-supreme-court-chief-justice-headed-to-u-s-bank-stadium-oversight-panel/410690155/
Skilled Bail Bonds Process | Orange County Fl Bail Bond 